Introduction and overview
Round 1 of the Reducing Burg l a ry Initiative (RBI) was built upon a strong evidence base of operational research, which had identified types of measures that can be effective in reducing burglary in local areas. A key objective of the RBI was to find out what works best where. Sixty three Strategic Development Projects (SDPs) were funded by Round 1 of the RBI. These projects were encouraged to develop innovative burglary reduction strategies. As a result, a wide range of interventions was implemented in a variety of contexts making use of different principles.
This paper presents a summary of one of these projects where activities undertaken were built along the general framework of police crackdown followed by consolidation interventions. The main/noteworthy interventions of this SDP were as follows: 
Establish costs of burglary
Between project before and after periods, there was a net fall in the number of burglaries of 39 per cent in the project area, when controlling for burglary trends in the rest of the Police Force Area 1 . The project was also found to be cost effective.
The views expressed in these findings are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the Home Office (nor do they reflect Government policy) 1. This net reduction in burglary figure is based on the number of burglaries per month during the project before and after periods of September 1997 to March 1999 and April 1999 and December 2000. These periods are used for comparison purposes for all SDPs as they are the longest comparison periods for which data is available for all the projects (see Kodz J and Pease K (2003) 'Reducing Burglary Initiative: early findings on burglary reduction' Home Office Findings 204. London: Home Office). Over these periods the Police Force Area saw a reduction in burglary of 8 per cent and the project area saw a reduction of 47 per cent, giving a net burglary reduction in the project area of 39 per cent.
Intelligence
I n te llig e nce invo lve s g ath er ing an d a nal ys ing information on crime and disorder problems and risks and their consequences, diagnosing their causes and identifying risk factors for offending.
General context
This project took place in two economically deprived estates that encompassed 2,420 households and 6,096 inhabitants. The area was defined as a typical lower to middle income suburban ward. The target area is in appearance pleasant and made up of well maintained large modern private estates along with older local authority owned pro p e rt i e s . H o w e v e r, it is geographically isolated, located between a major motorway and a canal. The ethnic characteristics of the local population in the area are mainly white together with a significant Indian population.
The crime problem
The area experienced many instances of anti-social behaviour and public order trouble; CCTV cameras had already been installed to overcome the problem. Housing on one of the estates was also very exposed to burglary due to poor levels of security, which had been a problem ever since the estate was built.
Police statistics provided pre-SDP burg l a r y data. An average of 162 dwellings per year were victimised over the three years before project launch, including 25 re p e a t victims in 1998. Newly developed private houses were highly targeted and tended to be broken into from the re a r.
Immediate causes and risk factors of burglary

Environment
Police evidence showed that neighbouring areas of o v e rg rown open lands had been used to store stolen p ro p e rty and conceal criminal activity. Some police re p res entatives described the area as 'a bu rg l a r 's paradise'. One of the estates in particular had low fences and poorly lit footpaths, which provided easy escape and access routes to the area.
Dwellings
The most recently built estate experienced high levels of b u rg l a r y. I t ap pe ar e d tha t the h ou si ng ha d be en developed re g a rdless of security concerns with poor quality windows and that this contributed to the burglary p roblem. Police modus operandi analysis indicated that the rear of the pro p e rties were vulnerable due to poorly secured windows and doors.
Offenders
Data derived from the police crackdown showed that local b u rg l a ry offenders were young males of white ethnic group aged between 14 and 35, with an average age of 22. Approximately half of these apprehended off e n d e r s lived in the target area. It was believed that some of the o ffenders intimidated other residents which led to the under reporting of crime. All the individuals arrested had a previous history of criminal activity, mainly burglar y, but also theft and handling offences.
The wider crime context -previous crime pre v e n t i o n initiatives
Prior to the RBI project taking place, there had been g rowing con cern amongs t th e l ocal re si dents and community representatives about the high crime reputation of the target areas. High visibility policing and crackdown operations had taken place on the estate in the year prior to the project. Nonetheless, burglary offences had begun to increase again prior to the RBI project start.
Interventions
I n t e rventions are how the action works: the causal principles or mechanisms -both civil prevention and traditional law-enforcement -that could be applied to block, disrupt or weaken the causes of criminal events or the risk factors, and strengthen the protective factors.
Targeting known offenders and high visibility policing
Police officers were to implement a 'zero-tolerance' appro a c h to target known offenders by the means of stop and searc h , s e a rching pro p e rties, bail enforcements, eviction and antisoci al beh aviour orders (ASBOs). The rationale behin d this method was to reduce burg l a ry by removing offenders from the estate and increase the risk of being apprehended. It also aimed to raise awarenes s amongs t residents and of fenders th at the police were committed to the estate and gain the local c o m m u n i t y 's confidence, thus increase the re p o rting of crime.
Implementation
Thi s pol ic e cra ckdo wn wa s a conti nuat io n of t he operations implemented prior to the launch of the RBI p roject. Elements of the previous crackdown scheme remained central to the RBI funded interventions that followed. Known offenders were identified through a combination of anecdotal and police evidence and by prior convictions.
Two police officers were specifically assigned to the target a rea. This was to avoid the possibility of other police priorities diverting staff time away from the project. It also developed the officers' knowledge of the local are a , making the identification of problems quicker and simpler. Police activity was allocated according to pre -i d e n t i f i e d burglary hot-spot locations and times of the day.
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Outputs Two police officers operated within the target area for 17 to 18 months. A further 12 police constables were tasked to the area between April and June 1999. 17 offenders w e re targeted of which 15 were charged. Of these, 11 were in custody at various times during the project period. Two received ASBOs, one an eviction ord e r, seven were subject to probation periods and three supervision orders.
Drawbacks
Eviction orders were believed to be problematic due to the risk of geographically displacing offenders, and thus not only displacing their criminal activity but also hindering the ability of authorities to track these individuals. There were also some problems identified with bail enforcement, as there was discrepancy in the leniency between different c o u rts. Offenders were aware of this and may have carried out their actions accordingly.
Property marking
' S m a rt Water' pro p e rty marking kits were used to mark residents' valuable property. Police visited all houses in the t a rget area to help and advise in the marking pro c e s s . StealthGuard 2 a security system was to be used alongside S m a rt Water kits but due to its unavailability was not utilised. Targeted households were to receive stickers that would publicise the marking of valuable pro p e rty in the area. The underlying aims of this intervention were to: q ease residents' fear of being burgled and losing valuable property q help i n t h e m o n i t o r i n g o f s t o l e n g o o d s , t h e i r recover y and of fender conviction q act as a deterrent to burglary by increasing the fear of being caught amongst criminals
Implementation
The police involvement in SmartWater was seen as raising the profile of the police in the local area.
The plan was to place stickers on windows of targ e t e d houses once all houses were pro p e rty marked and to display publicity about the scheme in the local shops, pubs and community centres. However this did not happen during the project period.
Outputs
By t he e nd of t he pr oj ect 55 % ( 1,32 5 ) o f a ll t he households in the area were covered by the pro p e rt y marking scheme. One item was re c o v e red thro u g h SmartWater identification.
Drawbacks
The police force saw the intervention as very costly both in t e rms of police time and monetary funds. The aim of covering all households in the area was over ambitious, due to staff shortages. Analysis of crime data indicated that narrower targeting of vulnerable or victimised households could have been just as effective. More o v e r, eviden ce sugges ted that of fe nder s adapted to the S m a rt Water scheme. As residents, including off e n d e r s , were given information on how the kits functioned, this is likely to have educated local burglars.
Increase Community Involvement
The SDP also planned to raise public awareness of b u rg l a ry prevention and increase the re p o rting of crime by distributing crime prevention packs, encouraging N e i g h b o u r h o o d Wa t c h , u s i n g radio links a n d o r g an is i ng a co m m u n it y c ri m e p r e v e n t i o n / i n f o rm a t i o n event. The aims of these community involvement schemes were to: 
Implementation
The delivery of crime prevention packs was alre a d y planned before RBI funding was secured and packs had a l ready been distributed prior to the proje ct start . Distribution of packs was a useful introduction to the f o rthcoming Smart Water intervention. Many re s i d e n t s would have received two visits from the police in one year, again helping to raise the profile of the police within the c o m m u n i t y. The orig i nal tar ge t of the nu mb er of Neighbourhood Watch schemes to be established was not reached due in part to a lack of enthusiasm of the 3 2.
StealthGuard is a security service that connects appliances via the mains supply and phone line to a BT operations centre which keeps track of the appliance's location via unique security codes. Each time a protected appliance is plugged in, it broadcasts a location request to the operations centre, but refuses to operate until it receives a response that matches its stored location. As a result, if the appliance is stolen, it will refuse to work in any location other than its home environment.
c o m m u n i t y, but also to a lack of police focus on this eleme nt of the project. Co de names wer e used to er adicate i mpro per us e of the rad io s. Commu nity enthusiasm for these was similarly low.
Outputs
Cr im e pr ev ent io n packs were del iv ered t o al l the house hol ds in the targe t are a. Th e numb er o f Neighbourhood Watch groups increased from 14 to 15. 21 radios were distributed to Neighbourhood Watch coordinators and community representatives.
Drawbacks
The r a d i o links we r e n e v e r u s e d d u e t o u s e r s ' l a c k o f confidence and their not knowing each other well enough to communicate in this way. There f o re the scheme was abandoned and instead the radios were diverted to local businesses.
Environmental improvements
I m p rovements to the area were achieved by firstly, e n v i ronmental work through the construction of a 'hot spot' map of the target area as part of an 'architectural survey' of the estate. This aimed to identify escape routes, poor lighting and crime hotspots. Environmental work followed on from the initial survey. Secondly, a 'Secure by Design' scheme was set up to establish constru c t i o n p rotocols for new private developers on the estate. The aim of these environmental inter ventions were to: q identify key problems by linking victimised areas with their environmental characteristics which may generate criminal activity, and q co n s t r u c t s t r a t e g i e s t o c o u n t e r a c t c r i m e ge nera tor s by de vel opi ng b ui lding -d esi g n procedur es to reduce burglar y in the long term.
Implementation
Analyses, mapping and surveys of hotspot areas were achieved by the local police force. Difficulties were experienced in reaching agreement between the police and the local authority planning department on how to respond to this problem. For this reason plans to remove access to paths were dropped. Instead, volunteers were used to clear alleyways of vegetation. Thorny shrubs were planted as part of a childre n 's 'Environment Fun Day'. Evidence such as blood from scratches left on the bushes could help in forensics identification. The underlying rationale of clearing underg rowth was that it would remove easy cover for criminals, increasing sight lines for natural surveillance and decreasing opportunities for hiding stolen goods.
The 'Secure by Design' initiative meant that developers had to regularly liaise with the police while underg o i n g building work. However the scheme depended on the flexibility of the police and the co-operation and interest of the developers.
Outputs
A map of the estate was drawn recognising sites of all attempted and actual burglaries in the past year along with access paths and areas covered by Neighbourhood Watch. Some recommendations were included in the guidelines for the building of a new estate; but these were not always fully complied with.
Drawbacks
As noted above, difficulties were encountered with q re a c h i n g a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e p o l i c e a n d planning authorities over the enviro n m e n t a l improvements to be made, and q developers complying with the guidelines to help to e n s u re new buildings were designed to be secure .
Youth Diversion Schemes
The project are a 's management intended to divert young people in the area from falling into criminal activity by setting up a youth diversion initiative that included the creation of a g a rden on the estate. Extra funding was made available for football coaching and a summer playscheme. The underlying principles for these schemes were that they would: 
Implementation
Practical details of the method: The garden scheme was to get children to create their garden on the estate and it was co-funded by the SDP and a voluntary sector org a n i s a t i o n . A communi ty ar tist was e mpl oye d by the pro j e c t management to meet up with teenagers and discuss what could/would be featured in the garden. Extra material and s t a f f s up p or t were p r ovi de d b y y ou t h an d lo ca l h ou s ing s e rvices. The garden was to be developed in two phases: phase one would see the clearing and preparation of the chosen spot and phase two the set-up of a covered feature . In addition, football coaching was organised and run by a local father. These projects were aimed at all 11 to 18 year olds on the estate.
Outputs q
Only phase one of the garden scheme was completed during the project period. 60 young peo ple attended the first meeting, 25 were involved in the implementation of phase one. 
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q A summer play scheme was set up for a duration of one month, taking place 5 times a week, involving 40 under 12s with one parent, 2 drivers, and 5 helpers.
q An after school club followed on from the summer play scheme, a local youth club reopened in 2000, a community centre youth project was getting started at the end of the SDP and the police force passed on the names of 2 offenders to another project.
Other initiatives
T h ree initiatives aimed at tackling repeat victimisation, a publicity campaign and establishing the costs of burglary showed only limited progress. The underlying aim of these i n t e rventions was to reduce repeat victimisation and i n c rease the local community's (including off e n d e r s ) awareness of crime prevention activity in the area.
Implementation q
Tackling repeat house burg l a ry was part of a wider objective for the whole police force. A database was maintained to re c o rd all re p e a t b u rg l a ry incidents. The scheme was halted after th e r e c o rd ed leve ls of bur g l a r y dr o p p e d significantly.
q Means of advertising used to publicise all SDP i n t e rventions included press releases, newspaper and newsletter articles. Particular attention was given to the fact that newspapers would only be i n t e rested in re p o rting on the pro j e c t 's activities once.
q Establishing the costs of burglaries in the targ e t area was successful in helping to achieve further local authority funding.
Implementation
Implementation is what is actually done -how the practical methods that realise the principles in locallya p p ropriate ways, are targeted and converted into action on the ground.
Inputs of funds, effort, human resources
The total crude input costs for this SDP totalled £222,204. Th e most c ostl y inter ve nt ion w as p r o p e rt ymarking/tracking, as it accounted for 35% of the total of the intervention costs, whereas high visibility policing and targeting of prolific offenders (both combined) accounted for 34% of the costs. Crime prevention packs accounted for 12% of the costs and the remaining 19% for the remaining seven low cost interventions. When looking at inputs in terms of resources, personnel was the most costly and predominant element (82%), followed by equipment (17%).
Management, planning, and supervision
The local police force led the project and responsibility for the project lay with the Sector Inspector and his Deputy Sergeant. However, their time was not solely dedicated to the project, and their other duties and commitments made it difficult to devote sufficient time to the management of the project.
The deployment of the Sector Policing model meant these officers' time was dedicated to the area and this allowed the police force to be more proactive (rather than reactive) and generated creativity within the project. Managers w e re concerned that some perf o rmance indicators could suffer as a result of the introduction of Sector Policing. In particular, there were concerns that neighbouring estates within the police force area experienced a rise in crime due to the shift in allocating resources to the SDP area.
Staff resources
Working in partnership with other agencies pro v e d beneficial in terms of the sharing of staff re s o u rc e s . H o w e v e r, police staff shortages reduced the number of officers working on the RBI project significantly at times.
Involvement in the community -part n e r s h i p , mobilisation, collaboration
P rofessionals, like the police, often have to work t h rou gh othe r s ra th er than directl y i nter v e n i n g themselves. Involvement is when those formally in c h a rge of a crime prevention project (who could themselves be a partnership) act through an existing partnership or mobilise other agencies, companies and individuals to collaborate in playing specific, limited parts in implementing the intervention.
Partnership
The local police led the project through a wider steering g roup which included re p resentatives from the local police, local authority (housing and planning), health a u t h o r i t y, com mu nit y (Nei g hbou rh ood Wat ch), a councillor and community artist. Meetings were thought crucial in developing strong partnership relations, as the police were keen to pass responsibilities onto agencies involved in the project. The local community health authority managed the environmental projects and the youth diversion schemes. Non-police agencies were more experienced in working with the community allowing the police to be allocated elsewhere. A good working relationship between the police and the local housing association prior to the RBI was essential for the Secure By Design scheme to work smoothly and to make pro g re s s with other initiatives.
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Mobilisation and collaboration
Community activity and cohesion was already very strong in the target area. Many families had lived on the estates for generations. The initial police crackdown depended on the public's willingness to give out information on local offenders. This was achieved by focussing on developing residents' confidence in the police force by allocating two officers on the beat for the first few months of the project and offering them protection. The pro p e rty marking and youth diversion schemes, and the community involvement elements of the project were also intended to alert , motivate and empower residents to act as crime preventers and to increase their confidence and faith in the police. It was hoped this would ultimately have the effect of increasing levels of reporting of crime.
Impact
Impact covers crime and disorder reduction achieved, cost effectiveness and wider learning points
The evaluation of the project
This project was subject to an independent impact, process and cost-effectiveness evaluation by South Bank University and collaborators in the Southern Consortium engaged to assess the Reducing Burg l a r y Initiative of the Crime Reduction Programme in England & Wales. The following results on impact and cost effectiveness are based on the S o u t h e rn Consort i u m 's findings. The impact evaluation design involved comparing changes in recorded burglary statistics over some 3 years. This was done in a) the target a rea (one beat); b) buffer zone to assess the extent of geographical displacement (five beats); and c) the rest of the police Basic Command Unit (BCU) minus the targ e t area (reference area used to outline background trends).
Crime reduction target
B u rg l a ry in the target area fell from Year -2 3 to Year -1 by 4% and then fell by a further 39% (a reduction of 67 b u rglaries) from Year -1 to Year 1. The decrease in burg l a ry at the start of the implementation period was part i c u l a r l y noticeable as 30 occurrences had been re c o rded in Marc h 1999, 13 in April and 2 in May. The fall was carried onto the period Year 1 to Year 2 (29%). There was evidence of both geographic displacement and some dispersal of benefits to selected neighbouring areas. Some functional displacement was thought to have occurred. Figures for theft and handling offences went up by 19% (n=19) from Year -1 to Year 1 along with burg l a ry non-dwelling, which went up by 90% (n=27) from Year 1 to Year 2.
Cost-benefit analysis
C rude costs were modelled 4 (£183,084), set against the national average cost of burglary 5 (£2,300) and against the estimated total saving of 123 burglaries in the project a rea over 2 years in order to calculate the cost benefit ratio of 1.38. This means that for every £1 worth of re s o u rces spent on the project, a maximum of £1.38 w o rth of re s o u rces was saved. As such the project was deemed to be cost effective.
Replicability and learning points
Some key learning points identified by this project are: q Experienced, enthusiastic and fully dedicated (from bid to completion) project management can achieve better results and foster positive long-term community relations q Clearly defining the initiatives' aims and regularly mo nitor in g t he m are impor tan t t o en su re successful outcomes q Crime prevention projects can displace crime issues to neighbouring areas q Giving responsibility to agencies experienced in communi ty wo rk hel ps to gain the publ ic 's confidence q U n i f o rmed police interventions can be a good public relations exercise and help in achieving the p u b l i c 's confidence. Good community spirit and cohesion within the loc al area make police interventions easier q Police 'crackdowns' can be effective in making quick gains. Benefits can be 'consolidated' in the longer-term by community-based interventions.
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